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Interview with Neil Hartigan

Date: 19 February 2009

Location: UIC Historian's Office, 815 W. Van Buren St., Chicago, IL.

Present: Neil Hartigan, Dr. Robert V. Remini, Dr. David W. Veenstra, Dr. Tim Lacy, and Jason Marcus Waak

(the interview has already begun)

Neil Hartigan (NH): They were trying to do something different. So nobody got on the ticket (RVR laughs). We don't want anybody.

Dr. Robert V. Remini (RVR): Yes. Before we begin, the University needs for you to sign a consent form for this interview (RVR hands NH the forms to read and sign).

NH: Sure.

RVR: We only need one copy?

Jason Marcus Waak: Yes. We just need one.

RVR: If you want to read it before you sign it, you can. I don't need these?

JMW: Right.

NH: I want to read it in terms of just the content. Let me look at it quickly. I've actually got a thousand boxes.

RVR: Really?

NH: Yes (NH laughs).

RVR: What are you going to do with them?

NH: Well, I don't know. Father Garzini talked to me about their new library up at Loyola.

RVR: You're a graduate?

NH: I am, of their law school. I went to Georgetown. And my dad died when I was a senior at Georgetown. He was the alderman in the ward. Here's one of the oddities we might talk about a little bit. He had been (Martin H.) Kennelly's city treasurer. So there were three aldermen that were elected against the party in 1955, which was a fight for control. My dad was one of them, from the Forty-ninth Ward. Thirty-seven and Nineteen were the other two. So in any event, Loyola was in the middle of the ward.

So Father (James F.) McGuire (, S.J.) called after the funeral. And he said, "We had a very high regard for your father, his ethics, and what he did for the community. And we assume that, given that, he didn't leave much in the way of worldly goods." I said, "You're not too far off with that one (NH and RVR laugh)." He said, "Well, I'm calling to let you know that if you'd like to try and follow in your father's footsteps, in government and politics, Loyola would like to do her part. So I'm calling to offer you a full scholarship to law school," which was how I got to law school.

RVR: Wow. It was a full scholarship.

NH: Yes. The mayor gave me a job shoveling coal. In those days, you went to law school from nine to twelve. And I got a job in the basement of the Board of Health. It's in the old Criminal Courts Building. It was from one to nine, shoveling coal (RVR laughs). I went on from there (RVR laughs). One of the great things about the mayor is that, in spite of the fact that my dad had been against him until his death, he gave me the opportunity. That was extraordinary because he was criticized. It was, "What the hell happened? Why didn't he help one of the people who was with us?" It was that kind of stuff.

RVR: Sure. So, you're thinking of giving your papers to them?

NH: Well, that's one possibility.

RVR: We're collecting, and we have the papers of Richard J. Daley in the library. We have some of the papers of Bill Daley. And we're hoping to build a real collection, not only of the Daley family, but also of those who were associated with him from Chicago politics, during that period. So I would extend an invitation to you.

NH: Well, I appreciate that. And I'll take it very seriously, because I need to do something to get a focus on the thing, while I can still sort of help out with what's there. Our family actually goes back to nineteen thirty, when (Mayor Anton) Cermak dumped my uncle from the ticket for state's attorney. The outfit had offered my uncle a third of the slot machines in Cook County. He told them what they could do with the slot machines (RVR laughs). He ended up chasing Cermak around the desk of the mayor's office, trying to get the hell out (RVR laughs).

The first day I went to work for the mayor, there was this magnificent desk out in the entry area, by the secretary. And I said, "Where did that come from?" They said, "That's Mayor Cermak's desk." Well, all of my life I had heard the stories of Mayor Cermak's desk, in the context of them chasing him around, trying to beat the hell out of him (RVR laughs).

My uncle lost on paper, by eleven thousand votes, which means he probably won by three quarters of a million, I suppose. And they didn't talk to either my uncle or my father for two years. So there was that piece. My dad was the city treasurer during the war without bond. The city was not bonded, because he was appointed, not elected. They didn't want to do a special election during the war. Then he was the city treasurer, then an alderman. So our family came to Rogers Park in nineteen fourteen, I think.

My mom was from out here, on the west side, Holy Family.

And then, from that point on, the civic activities in Rogers Park and Edgewater, I became the committeeman. I knocked out the guy that my father had a problem with. Then, there was the job I mentioned to you, that I was counsel for health and mental health. And then I went to work for the mayor's office and ended up as deputy mayor there. And then I got dumped (RVR laughs). And I was counsel for parks and museums. I got dumped five times (RVR laughs).

I loved him. He was my second father, for all practical purposes (RVR laughs).

Then, there was lieutenant governor, and attorney general. And in between, I was one of three guys sent to China in 1978, for the first banking relationship between the People's Republic of China and First National. It was the first bank in the western world that had a relationship. It was the first corporate board meeting.

Then I came back and did a variety of things, some governmental. I was the U.S. delegate to the Environmental Committee, that was headed by Jacques Cousteau, for the founding of the E.B.R.D. in eastern and central Europe. And then I was elected to the appellate court. So the stuff rather covers a long period, both local and statewide, because I was both the attorney and lieutenant governor. So I'll just find out....

RVR: Yes. The state would like us to become a branch of the state library system. We've talked to them. And we thought we'd try to build a new building in which there would be a museum. We'd put the mayor's desk there, and any other material that the family chooses to add to it, and then, as many different collections of papers and documents that deal with the history of Chicago.

NH: I think Mike Holland was, too. But in terms of people who had multi state wide offices from Chicago and that sort of thing, maybe there are a couple. That's one of them anyway. So that might prove to be of some interest to you. Okay now, what do you want?

RVR: That's very good. We'd like to start by asking you how you became involved with Richard J. Daley (NH laughs), what you thought of him as a man, as a politician, and as a mayor. Just take it from there. When did you first meet him? When did you first come in contact with him?

NH: Well, I had grown up in one of the five or six political families, and that's all there are, where the sons or daughters follow the parent into political life in Chicago. As long ago as I can remember, I did some work in my dad's precinct in the Forty-ninth Ward. My dad had been the city treasurer. He was actually from Bridgeport as well, and knew the mayor. My dad was from Twenty-ninth and Wallace. He was the youngest of fourteen children. There were three girls and eleven brothers (RVR laughs).

RVR: In those days, that was a big family (RVR laughs).

NH: Yes. His dad had been crippled in a teamster accident. He was in a wheelchair on his front porch for the rest of his life. So they were really raised by my grandmother. The mayor's family, as you know, lived three or four blocks away, I guess. So they did know each other. So I went to different things with my father, both when he was the city treasurer, and then also when he was an alderman. I met the mayor in that context.

I guess the first time I really met him was when my dad was ill. He had diabetes and arthritis and was dying of it. There was a dedication of the lights on Clark Street, which was in Rogers Park. It was sort of the main business thoroughfare. It was at Clark and Morris. There were literally thousands of people. I mean, the picture is still there because the First Commercial Bank is on the corner. So my dad told me to go over and speak on his behalf. And the mayor was there.

RVR: He was the mayor at that time?

NH: Yes. I was sort of learning the hard way how to swim, sort of being dropped in the middle of the lake, to have thousands of people there. And they had the mayor on top of it (RVR laughs). So I spoke at that dedication. Then I met him at McGuane Park when that was dedicated, out in Bridgeport. Mr. McGuane, the mayor, and everybody from the neighborhood my dad grew up with were all there. My dad took us out there. So it would be in that context that I met him.

I met him on a more serious basis, when my dad passed away, which was when I was a senior at Georgetown. It was actually about a month before graduation. The mayor was very sensitive and very kind, as far as my mom was concerned, our family, and what have you. It was a huge wake. I remember the car. There were two fellows standing on the corner. I said, "What's all of this?" You'd see cars, patrol cars, and all of that. And they said, "It's for Dave Hartigan's funeral. He was a good guy. He deserved it." So that was probably the nicest accolade.

But that was sort of the way the mayor was treating it, too. They had only been opposed in one election, in 1955. So, I can talk a little bit about it. He had said to my mom if there was anything he could do to help her, or anything for the family, he'd be glad to do it. The people in

the neighborhood, since my dad had just been reelected, they thought very well of my mom. They wanted her to run for alderman. She didn't want to do it. She also didn't want to be taken care of.

But I did ask her, given the fact that Father Maguire had made the offer to provide a scholarship to go to Loyola Law School because of the respect that he had for my dad. It gave me a chance to follow in my dad's footsteps, in government, in politics, and in law. When I found out that the classes were from nine to twelve, I made some inquiries and I found a laborer's job shoveling coal. It was in the basement at Board of Health at Hubbard and Dearborn. That was from one to nine. So I could get from Loyola (NH and RVR laugh) down to the Board of Health.

I asked my mom to call the mayor and get an appointment to go and see him. So I did. I walked in and here was the mayor, you know (NH and RVR laugh). He couldn't have been nicer. So I told him that I would appreciate it very much if I could get a job. I was the oldest boy. We had four kids in the family. So I had to help out and what have you, which is the way it's supposed to be, I think.

So he said, "What would you like to do?" And I said, "I'd like to be a laborer. I understand there's a vacancy in the basement of the Board of Health." He said, "What? What do you want to do that for (RVR laughs)? You're from Georgetown. There are some things that we can use your degree for (NH and RVR laugh)." I said, "Mr. Mayor, this is the one that fits." So he said, "Well okay, if that's what you want, that's fine." I said, "On the other hand, if it's okay with you, I'd like to come back and see you a little later, after we get law school taken care of." He was fine about that.

Then I got involved in politics. As I said, from the time I was in grammar school, my brother and I helped my dad and that sort of thing. I remember my dad telling me, "If you're not in the room, you can't have much effect on things." What he was talking about was that, in his case, his ambition was always to be a judge. My Uncle Matt, who I mentioned to you was the person who took on Cermak and the syndicate. He was a judge. So it was very difficult, because of the limitation in numbers, to have two judges from the same family. But everybody was telling my father that they were for him. But he wasn't a committeeman, so he wasn't in the room.

So I figured, "Okay, if I'm going to be in this business, I've got to try and learn it, both the

politics and the government, on a professional basis. And play the game depending on the way the cards come up." So I started to do that. And at the same time, as I was doing those other things, the fellow who was the committeeman, George Lane, who my father had beat for alderman, he wanted another Hartigan around like he wanted an extra left leg (RVR laughs).

So he gave me the precinct that finished ninety-eighth out of ninety-eighth in the Forty-ninth Ward. It was where the Republican state representative lived in a high rise, near the people of the Jewish faith that live on Sheridan Road. It was not a real easy place to work. And I knew what he wanted to do with it. He wanted to take the results. Somehow he'd make sure that the mayor saw that I finished that way and that I'd finished things early. So I got about thirty young people whom I'd gone to school with. We did everything I've ever seen in an election. We finished seventeenth, from ninety-eighth to seventeenth, for Daley's election. Then I met him after that.

I got to know Dr. Sam Adelman, who was the Commissioner of Health. The mayor brought him in from Kentucky. He was a public health officer, who succeeded Herman Bundesen. He was a good public health officer. But he didn't know anybody in Chicago. So he had a lot going. He didn't know too many people. I was an expert on the basement of the Board of Health (NH and RVR laugh). So I had nothing going. But I knew my dad's friends. So I started doing volunteer work for him, like advanced work, writing speeches, and that sort of stuff. Then one day, he asked me if I'd like to become his assistant. I figured that there was a little bit more opportunity on the third floor than there was in the basement (NH laughs). It was the difference between a white collar and a blue collar, if I went.

Then later, when I finished law school, I became counsel for health and mental health in Chicago. Well, one of the things that I had asked was something my dad had told me. He said, "You'll never know anything about politics in Chicago, until you get out of Chicago, like when you go to Springfield." I had no idea what that meant.

So when I was at the Board of Health, I asked Dr. Adelman if I have, as part of my job, the liaison with the mayor's office, with the city council, and with the state legislature on health related bills. So he said, "Okay."

Other than working for the mayor, which was best postgraduate course that you could ever have, that was the best experience I had. That's because, seeing that, I found out that what I always thought was the World Series, i.e. Chicago politics, really wasn't. The power of the city,

the mayor, the city council, and this was before home rule on top of that, was very limited. The real power rested in the state. It's just like the mayor and the city council. I mean, it's really a weak mayor and a strong council system.

But he knew what to do with it. What I saw down there was that, as it was applied back, was that what the mayor had seen when he went to Springfield, he, Tom Keane, (Vito) Marzullo, (Max) Adamowski, and all of those fellows, they were trained in a real executive, legislative process. And so, they had an enormous advantage against the other aldermen. They just thought they were supposed to take care of the neighborhood, that kind of stuff. You know, there was no formal committee schedules, agendas, bill numbers, research, staff, etc. They knew what they were doing. So it was a big leg up.

In any event, I got to know the mayor a little bit more there. And finally, there became an opening in the mayor's office for an assistant. There was Ray Simon, who lived in our community, Edgewater, I only knew a little bit from going to law school. I always say that he should be one of the profiles of courage, because he was the one who recommended me to the mayor. So the mayor did interview some other people first.

I was at the point where I was either going to go into the State's Attorney's office, the U.S. Attorney's office and be a litigator, or go into the mayor's office and use law in the executive branch which, frankly, was what I preferred to do. But the mayor kept interviewing guys (NH laughs).

So anyway, it took a year. And then, one day I was invited to go over and see the mayor. So I showed up. Now at this point, other than Lyndon Johnson, he was the most powerful person in the country. Well, you'd walk in and here was this big desk with a green cover. He was sitting there, very polite, and very nice. So I sat down. And doctor, I had the single worst interview in the history of the western world. I mean, I was a mumbling idiot.

RVR: You were that nervous?

NH: Well, I don't know. This was him (NH laughs), and working for the mayor. What was I? I was twenty four or something like that. So finally, he said, "Well Neil, why do you want to be in government?" And I said, "Mr. Mayor, it's because in our family, when we were growing up, we were taught that we were given gifts. And someday we have to answer for our gifts, in terms of

what you do to help people with them. And I think, other than a religious calling, that government and politics are the places where you can do more than any place else to take whatever skills that God gave you to actually help people that deserve it." And it was such a square answer that I knew I couldn't be lying, because who would think that one up?

That was exactly how he felt. I mean, he would have put it much better than how I put it. But that was at the core, the Richard J. Daley, the Mayor Daley that I knew. You know, there were seventy-two of them. And you had to sort of decide which one of them that you were dealing with. But at the essence of him, that was what it was all about. I mean, he did more things that he didn't get credit for that were pure service to thousands and hundreds of thousands of people over the years, not just in Chicago. But they were copied all over the country, like some places overseas as well. But they stemmed from values, the values that he had.

RVR: Do you have some examples of what he did for individuals?

NH: Well, I just gave you one (NH laughs). There are a variety of different answers to that. I'll give you a couple of them. There is one thing, for instance, in terms of the boss idea. Was he a tough political leader? Absolutely. There is no question about it. He had a great organizational mind. He had a capacity to think multi dimensionally. He was one of the few people, maybe the only one that I've ever met, who would take six or seven steps out of what this action would result in. You know, that was an extraordinary gift

Okay, there are two schools of thought in politics. One of them is that you never make anybody who can unmake you. And the other one is that you bring together the best talent that you can. If you're a confident leader, you're not worried about them removing you.

But you can see the weak leader, you know, the one who make anybody who can unmake you. They have a fence around them. And the mayor was exactly the opposite.

The idea of Ray Simon being the deputy mayor and the corporation counsel, I was following him. At one time doctor, I was doing licenses, contracts, patronage, set up the data center, the legislature in Springfield, and someone with the city council. Those are all of the money subjects. One fix was more than the salary that I was making. One fix on one case was more than the salary that I was making.

So he gave Ray a chance. He gave me a chance. He gave Jim McDonough a chance, as

the Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation. There was Joe Fitzgerald. I mean, here were all of these young guys. I mean, who would bring together that kind of group? If you think of Mayor Kennelly's cabinet, which was first rate, John Ward, Jim Giardino, and those fellows, they were fine. But they were people that were all of one vintage. The mayor brought people in that were there. We were all at least of some degree of intelligence. Ray, for instance, was brilliant. And so were a lot of the other fellows.

But common sense, work twenty hours a day because you love it. They wouldn't take a cent. And they were one hundred per cent loyal, maybe one hundred and fifty per cent loyal. And they would come to him with ideas. They weren't afraid to suggest to him new ideas. At some point in time, I'd like to tell you a little bit about what they called "Chicago 67," "We Care," and "For Chicago." Those were three separate campaigns that I put together for the mayor. You had the traditional campaign. Frankly, Paul Douglas lost sixteen wards to Chuck (Charles) Percy in 1966, which was unheard of, should that happen. I don't care what the age was, what the center of Douglas's health was. I don't care. It shouldn't have happened. So I thought I had some idea as to why it was happening. I wrote twenty pages of longhand on legal pad, like you have (David W. Veenstra, DWV, laughs). I wrote a campaign that cut across the grain.

So I went in to see the mayor. I said, "I think what's happening mayor is that the young people are being shut out. The committeemen don't want them. They don't want to be threatened by them, etc. I know you're busy. But I've written up an outline for a different kind of campaign to complement the traditional campaign that you have. As I said, if you're busy, I'd be glad to brief George Dunne. And he could fill you in, if that's more convenient for you." He said, "Neil, if you get too busy to take care of your own political activities, you're too busy to be in office. Sit down." So I sat down (NH laughs). For an hour, he had me read the whole thing to him the twenty pages.

The reason that I bring that up in this context of the people he was putting around him was that we put together fifteen thousand young people in that program. And there were only three of us that worked for the government. The criteria was that you had to be under thirty. You couldn't work for the government, as putting politics under the people's terms instead of the politician's terms. But there was no other political leader in this country who would allow an army of fifteen thousand white collar people, basically, white and blue collar, successful young people to come together. You know, they'd be looking over their shoulder and they'd be scared to

death. Without him asking us, I put it back out of business the day after the election, because that was what should have happened to the thing.

But that's a strong leader. And he did the same thing. He was the one who broke it open for the young guys to come in as committeemen. We put into that sixty-seventh, which I could describe to you in detail. But we opened offices in all sixteen wards that Douglas had lost. And the committeemen wanted to kill me. He loved it. That was called Chicago 67. The logos and the whole thing was from a modern advertising campaign. It showed a strong, bold arrow coming up from the city, the green city, that kind of thing, with 67 on it. So it was a modern thing.

The next thing was We Care, which was four years later. We Care was in 1971. And what we were saying then was there were thousands and thousands of people, in fact, more people that were in the street than were not in the streets, were in the system, making the system work, and making citizenry work in Chicago. And we cared every bit as much as people who were in the streets. You know, some of them were a little misguided. And we took on, I think, Billy Singer ran at that time.

So at that time, we increased the age by another five years. We were getting to be the oldest young people in politics, for a while there (NH laughs). So the first thing out of the box, we decided to have a rally out in Hyde Park, at the Brown House, or whatever the restaurant was out there. So on a Sunday afternoon, five thousand young professionals showed up just to let Billy (Singer) know they were around (NH and RVR laugh). Actually, Billy started in Chicago 67. And it was only the stupidity of the ward committeeman in the Forty-fourth Ward that, again, drove a guy like Singer out.

The so-called independents never should have happened. There were plenty of ways that he was allowing and urging independents within the party. For Chicago, the next 1975, the theme there was because he didn't need to run again. It was For Chicago. Chicago needed him more than he needed it.

So in any event, the example of the kind of people he put in positions of immense power, this was years before we would have ever had the opportunity to do that. There was what he did with Dan Rostenkowski in Congress, to get Dan in a position where he could be the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. That's because the south had controlled all of those powerful committees. There were these campaigns. But on a human basis, there was the first Mayor's Office of Inquiry and Information. In other words, there was the first ombudsman service in a

mayor's office.

He set that up. He founded it. A guy named John Billings headed it up for him. You didn't have to go to your alderman or your ward committeeman. It was one stop shopping. A citizen could go to the mayor's office on the first floor, walk in, and say, "I don't know where to get started. Here's my problem." And then, it became the mayor's problem and our problem, staff wise, to solve it.

In other words, what the aldermen and committeemen liked to do, he went around the whole system to make sure that the average citizen had a chance. With this university, the first bill he ever introduced, when he went into the legislature, was a creation of a great university in the urban setting of Chicago, where kids whose parents were of average or less income, would have an opportunity at higher education. And it was a terrible political risk, as you remember, from the movement that had to take place to open up this kind of land here and what have you. But he felt that strongly. And there were the basics. He had the first program for senior citizens. The first program for the disabled. The first office of inquiry and information. He fought for this kind of a quality university.

I know that this is rambling a bit. I went to see him. I was thirty-one when I was elected as the lieutenant governor. Before I went down to take the oath, I went to him and said, "Mr. Mayor, you've seen the whole thing. In a lot of ways, I'm just getting started. So if it's not presumptuous, I'd like to ask you if you have any advice you could give me on how to handle things." He said, "Neil, don't forget where you came from." And that was it. He was talking about values. He wasn't talking about Rogers Park, or Bridgeport. He was talking about values.

And you could see, going back to what we were talking about, when he went to mass every day, he wasn't just passing time kneeling. He was into what those things were about. He carried those gifts that he had over into the challenges, the tough urban challenges, the city that works. Who does it work for? In the vast majority of the cases, well, I can't say all, but in an awful lot of the creative programs that came into urban government in the years that he was the mayor, they came from here and were copied from here.

When I was at the Board of Health, there were three board-trained psychiatrists--Shift, Keller, and Futterman. They came into the demonstration program from model cities. And what they were trying to find out was why so many kids in Woodlawn--Woodlawn was the neighborhood that they chose--were acting out. They were so disruptive in first and second

grade. This was in 1964. This was during Johnson.

So we went out there and gave them a completely different kind of office. It was all white with modern furniture, anything that the government wouldn't normally do. But this was a neighborhood. The precinct captains couldn't get in. Nobody could get in. There were the Blackstone Rangers. This was the toughest, sixty-third street, which was the toughest part of the neighborhood.

They got the mothers of Woodlawn. The mothers of Woodlawn figured out that this program was really good for their babies. They were psychiatrists. So they were doctors as well. They went in and they tested the kids. And the reason a lot of them were acting out was because they couldn't see the blackboard, or they couldn't hear. They were dyslectic. Or they were ADD. Or they were all sorts of things. Nobody ever bothered to ever look at it that way. That was the kind of program that the mayor supported and made possible. And then, when it worked, it spread out to here. Then it became a model across the board.

So, those all come down. You can measure a government's effectiveness pretty easy. Just put one person on the other side of the table and say, "How does it affect him or her?" And essentially, that's what the mayor did. At the same time, he was in the room. He was the smartest, toughest guy in the game. That's because, to me, politics was always the access to the power to (a) get you into senior government responsibility and (b) to give you the ability to carry out the ideas. All of the ideas are great at a cocktail party. Like I said about my friend who was the distinguished commentator on political science, he finished last.

You've got to relate the two pieces. You've got to be in the room. He very much was. And he gave a whole generation of people, like myself, that he really had no reason to do it for, a chance to be in the room governmentally and politically after he was gone. I'm winding on. So maybe we'll bring it back to someplace where it will fit together (NH laughs). But those were some of the kind of things. But you'd see him. Well, I said that there were seventy-two Mayor Daley's. Mayor Daley knew more about my father-in-law's illness than I did. My wife came from New Canaan, Connecticut. And her dad was still out in Connecticut. Now, how Mayor Daley knew he was sick or anything about it, I don't know. But he did.

You wonder about, with everything he had, how he and Mrs. Daley could be so aware of the human part of the people that they were involved with. It was not just employees. I mean, you saw how they stayed involved in activity, and involved in the community. I mean, there

wasn't anything in the abstract. They never got amnesia about their family first, and then their community. You know, when I said the seventy-two people, you tried to imagine working with him (NH laughs). Not that he was the easiest person to work for, that I ever worked for.

RVR: He was not the easiest?

NH: He was the easiest.

RVR: He was?

NH: Absolutely. I mean, you didn't have a sign on the wall that the standard around there was excellence. If you couldn't figure that out, you were too stupid to be there to start with (NH and RVR laugh). I mean, his standard was excellence. And so, with everybody there, you knew that. I mean, you wanted to be that. He'd take a briefcase home. You know, you'd read about how he'd go home for dinner and then he'd go out somewhere. He'd take a briefcase home stuffed. He would come back the next morning. And oftentimes, it would be one hundred per cent worked. But the minimum would be seventy to eighty per cent.

Well, that takes a lot of discipline and a lot of professionalism to stay that involved. I mean, he read those reports. He was really something. The best government experience I ever had with him was when he would have the budget hearings, his own version of budget hearings (RVR laughs). The ones in the city counsel didn't count. You know, that was show business. I mean, it was official. Each department would go in. They had a time to present their budget to the Finance Committee. And they were questioned. That was the official time. It counted.

But the real one was at eight o'clock in the morning in his office on a one to one basis. And the best post graduate courses that I ever participated in was to be a fly on the wall in the row of chairs in the back. I was the third one in the room. I'd just sit there, pre-read the material they were coming in with, and what have you. And then, I'd just watch it. The worst thing that you could do was to try and con him. If you were consciously trying to lie to him, that was even worse.

But he'd say, "Who do you think you're talking to? In that line three years ago, you told me that you were going to do this, this, and this. Now, those are your results. Now get the hell

out of here. And don't come back here unless you've got a real program that you're going to present to me that's accurate, and that's really going to do something for the people." I didn't need coffee after that. I was wide awake (NH, RVR, and DWV laugh). And they knew it. Their preparations for their sessions with him, which, if they had done their homework and they had good programs put together, were fine.

He was the quintessential government professional. When somebody asks me about him, I always say that the thing that was the most misunderstood was that people would look at the political leader, the boss routine (NH laughs). The boss is certainly an interesting name for it. But when you come down to the whole picture, his strength was that multidimensional picture. It was the experience that he had and the unbelievable knowledge of public finance that he had.

Every single job that he had, if you'll track it, was in finance. He was in finance in the county treasurer's office, before he went to the legislature. In the legislature, he was in finance. He was a spokesman on revenue in the Senate. He was Stevenson's director of revenue. And he ran the cabinet for Stevenson, because Stevenson wasn't a hands-on guy. So basically, he was running the government. When he came back up, he was at the county clerk's office. But he wasn't there that long. But the first thing that he did in the mayor's office was this hands-on, finance side, in these budgetary hearings.

And there was the immense respect that the business community had. How the leading Democratic elected official in the country in many respects, other than the president, could have the support of almost the totality of the business community, the CEO's, that he had? I mean, if you look at it, objectively and politically, it's unbelievable. The reason was that he understood if you don't have a strong economy, you don't have jobs. If you don't have jobs, you don't have the taxes to pay for the social services. And if you don't have that, you can't enhance the quality of life for people. He understood that you had to have a strong business community.

So consequently, the CEO's had no hesitancy to call directly if they had a problem. And you didn't have to ask him what you were supposed to do about it. If one of those calls came in, you just got it done. Or he'd give it to you and you'd get it done, or whatever. But they had a sense that it was very much in Chicago's best interest, and in their businesses' best interest, to have this extraordinary relationship of the leadership of business, labor, the academic community, and government that he uniquely put together in Chicago.

RVR: While other cities were going bankrupt, Chicago had an AA or AAA bond rating.

NH: Right. And he knew enough about government, because he was an expert in it, that he didn't go for the fads. If you remember in the fifties and the sixties, the idea of the council of seven, eleven, and this and that, was the fact that you can't have these big governing bodies, like a city council that has fifty members. That's crazy. You streamline it. Well, when you streamline it, what happens is that you remove from the individual citizen's access the opportunity to be in touch directly with an elected official that they have had the chance to vote for.

One of the best examples of that was when John Lindsay got elected (mayor) in New York. Lindsay sent his top people out. He asked the mayor if he could send his people out to take a look at what the mayor was doing here, with the mayor's office and the cabinet. Well, if you compare the two styles, let's say that they were both going to announce the same program. Well, Lindsay would hold a press conference and announce it. Okay, that's nice. Depending on the time of day and how it went, it might get x amount of visibility. The mayor would announce it. Lindsay had nothing to take it out. The mayor had this massive mechanism of governmental and political activity.

When we'd go into the County Central Committee meeting, there were fifty ward committeemen and thirty township committeemen, the eighty made up the County Central Committee. There was a teacher. He'd teach those programs. I'd sit there and I'd think, "I'm back in school." With the presentations he'd make to us, he'd teach them to us knowing that at the next ward meeting or whatever we had, we'd teach it to the captains. They, in turn, would go out and explain it to the people. So he had this massive contact with the average citizen to take his programs out on a basis, where you'll find out very quickly if they work or not. That's because the first time you knock on a door, you'd say, "I'm here to ask you to have your kid participate in the polio vaccine program."

Well, you were either going to get a very positive reaction. Or they'd say, "I wouldn't let my kid!" Then you'll know. Lindsay wouldn't know. And the same thing was true with the council of seven and eleven. The mayor understood the value of having the broad base. Right now, it's 67,500, in theory, for each ward. So, the citizen here has an alderman. In those days, you had a precinct captain, then an assistant precinct captain, then an alderman, a committeeman, three state representatives, a state Senator, a Congressman, the mayor, and the other officials at

the municipal level.

Well, that's a lot of contact for the individual citizen. That's because to understand what their needs were, you had to have a mechanism to find out. And that's what the whole process was about. That's because if you were reading that, when the person went back, I'm talking about an area like ours that was issue oriented, you weren't going to send somebody to the door of somebody that was making three times the salary and convince them by saying, "Well, your mother was a Democrat twenty years ago." I mean, we had to have arguments to meet them on an intellectual basis as well. So anyway, I've studied it too far.

But basically, that had a lot to do with it. So if you look at the finance side, those CEO's got it. They understood. They could be for Republicans on all of the national stuff, the U.N., the satellites, and everything else (NH laughs). But right here, in their backyard, they were unequivocally for him. And what I did in those campaigns, by the way, when I ran, I took the same process that he put together, and dropped it down thirty years.

When I showed it to him, the only thing he changed in the twenty pages was when he said, "Don't take anybody from the suburbs." I said, "Well mayor, you have leaders from the suburbs." He said, "Yes. But I had to do that. This is your city, your generation's city. And now, there's enough talent in the city. Have everybody that's involved in the city be from the city." He was so incisive about the twenty pages and picked that one thing. So he was remarkable in an awful lot of different ways.

RVR: But he was a boss.

NH: Yes.

RVR: He was in charge.

NH: Do you mean governmentally, politically, or both?

RVR: I guess both. What do you say? How did he become a boss? Was it this structure that he established from within the party? Or was it something personal?

NH: Well, it was personal. In any situation doctor, you look at the structure. One of the reasons we had the trouble and got kicked out of the convention (NH laughs) was because the McGovern people had taken over the inside of the structure of the Democratic National Committee. They took the rules committee there. And nobody had ever bothered about that. Keane wanted to just kill it. Whereas, the mayor was very good on structure. So, you asked me how he became a leader? How he became a leader was fifty per cent plus one in the Cook County Central Committee. Technically, that's how you do it, just the same way that you do it in the mayor's office.

Now, each of those jobs have certain statutory powers with them. And they also have potentials with them, in a variety of different ways. The person thinking of the word boss thinks of somebody swaggering around saying, "You're going to do this." If you're going to do that, you're not a very strong leader. He was a very, very strong leader. He never asked you to do anything that he hadn't done himself, and wasn't willing to still do himself (NH laughs). Everybody knew that. And they knew that he outworked everybody.

But he had the common sense to maintain the majority that you needed and build those up as much as you could to make it that much easier. By the same token, he wasn't relying on it. I mean, he knew it was there. But he didn't throw it in your face. He told me, "Neil, you've always got to have a program. You've got to have your own program. Otherwise, you're just reacting to other people." And I created the first department on aging in the country in nineteen seventy three. There was no senior citizen movement or anything else. It was just that I saw people in our parish who had paid taxes for forty or fifty years.

Now, the husband is dead. "Mrs. Jones," who used to be a giant in our neighborhood when she walked down the street, she was Jimmy's mother and that kind of stuff. You'd knock on her door politically. She'd have a two room flat with a hot plate for a companion. I thought, "This is the payoff, after all of that, raising a family, being the backbone of the neighborhood, the parish, and everything, and paying taxes?" So what I did was that I took the strength of the idea.

And the strength of the idea was dignity, the level of dignity that that person should be entitled to live with. And that was the report that we wrote, "The Matter of Dignity." Then we did the legislation. I had been (Senator Paul) Simon's running mate. Unfortunately, Walker beat Simon. So I got stuck with that little ticket. And every program I did, I'd take ten first. Then they'd throw me out. So then, we'd go beat them. But it was the first one in the country. It was

the strength of an idea. We had our own program. Well, I learned that from him, maybe not in the same words.

We'll talk once in a while, when we get together, the guys that worked for him. We'll say, "It was just amazing." None of us can tell you exactly what the training method was. But we've had so many different kinds of jobs that he prepared us for, how to think, how to reason, how to make judgments, and restraining the timing. And none of us know what the system was. But you look at the people that worked for him over the years. He did it to everybody. I mean, we'd be an international banker (NH laughs). I was. I was in charge of [inaudible] for the First National Bank. And we were the best reference center they had. I was just using principles that I learned.

So he was very good on that. He didn't have a program. He didn't have a plan. He knew who was putting out and who was conning. I mean who the con men were, the ones who were all show business. There were some people who appeared to be very miserable in the press. And they couldn't organize a phone booth. But they were self-serving. He knew the cons and fakers from the people that were genuine. He'd give you support to try new ideas out. If you had a tougher problem than your neighbor, he'd give you more resources to try it.

I was trying to make the party the civic leader of our neighborhood. That's because I thought if we could position ourselves as the civic leader by actions, the people who had no interest in a government job period, but did want to have a quality community, they might see this as part of the process to get it to them. They'd be willing to volunteer. So he did it in an awful lot of different ways in the exercise of power. If you've got good ideas, they're well put together, the timing is right, and you walk in with professionalism, why is the opposition going to stand up? Are they going to do that on every issue? They'd look goofy.

I think, for instance, Obama giving the Republicans three spots in his cabinet, at the same time, they're not giving him one vote in the House of Representatives in the middle of the worst fiscal crisis, and personal financial crisis since the depression, if that doesn't come back to haunt them, nothing will. That's because they have no alternative. It's the same thing with him. So he knew how to use power, when he had to use the power. But you're a lot more powerful if you use restraint, lead with the strength of ideas, and then, dealing with unreasonable people, it's important that you win, then you use the power. And then, people are willing to support you. So I saw a lot of that.

RVR: You mentioned how important he was in the creation of the University of Illinois at Chicago.

NH: Absolutely.

RVR: Could you tell us anything more about what you know he did to advance it, whether he was pleased with what happened? He had a fight, of course.

NH: It was enormous.

RVR: It came right to his office.

NH: Yes. It came to his office and his home.

RVR: He sued up to the Supreme Court.

NH: Yes. Well, it was very difficult because this was a very strong, ethnic community, in many respects. The poor Italian community had been very supportive, if you look at the eleventh ward. The eleventh ward was a combination of Irish, Italian, Lithuanian, and some Polish. But the Italians are the second piece of it. So there were very strong human relationships over the years. But it was the idea of having to take the only place that afforded to get the great urban university accessible through the core of the urban population.

Another thing that he did, and one of the reasons I believe that he wanted it down here, look at the other cities. Why did the other cities fall apart and Chicago didn't? One reason was strong leadership. Part of it was the modern council of eleven that we talked about. Another part of it was that they didn't have political power or the governmental strength to take the trends that were happening economically and deal with them. Railroads, for instance, always come into the downtown of an urban area. That's how the downtowns got built.

Well, the patterns for commerce changed. So consequently, instead of coming into the downtown area, they went around the outside, just like the expressways, the outside. Well, what the mayor did was that he would not allow that to happen. If you think of Chicago, and take the

loop as the heart, here's the Dan Ryan, here's the Stevenson, here's the Eisenhower, here's the Kennedy, and here's the Edens going into the Kennedy. Those are arteries going into the heart. This was the one urban city where you had strong enough leadership that knew what it was doing to not allow the heart in the core of the city to die.

Think of the rest of the cities and how the downtowns died during those years, and how they had to be brought back. Daley didn't let that happen. He forced them to not only do that, but he also put the first mass transit in the median strip, right outside here. It was the first one to go up to O'Hare. Well, what that did was it allowed the minority workers to get to the jobs that were being put out. So he kept the community working and kept the ability to come into the core of the community, for both individuals for work and for commerce.

Then, the railroads were land rich and cash poor. So that's what started selling off the [inaudible] rights and the whole thing for the development of Randolph Street down to the Field Museum. Ad you know, the Montgomery Ward case in 1960 said that it had to be open free and clear. In that, by the way, there was one guy that had the guts to take on the establishment, Montgomery Ward.

And that's why we have the front yard that we have, as opposed to a city that's a lot like ours, Toronto. But they've got a junk yard for a front yard. If you look at the land use, those are railroads. All of those are railroads. There are five levels at Randolph Street of different kinds. You have foot walk, railroad, trucks, and all sorts of different uses. So he took it and developed the positives, working with business. The first one was Prudential. Then there was Swearington. Daley did the Standard Oil Building. And then, out here on the south side, later, after he was dead, that's the same thing. Those are railroad yards that are being developed. So he was a very strong urban planner.

Now, let's go back to your basic question about the university. Where's the spaghetti bowl? Where does it all come together? Where would you want to have a university? You'd want to have it where the kids from all over would have the best access to it. And there had to be a very tough political fight. And then, if you look at the stadium, the United Center, and Rush, take that and work that backwards. The university is the anchor over here.

(end of video tape one)

NH: So Daley came to see him. He said he had the plans for the Kennedy. It didn't go through the front door. But it must have been a foot away from the front door. It was going to end the community (NH laughs). The story that I heard was that Daley came to see him. He said, "We've got to do something." He said, "What are you talking about? You're a chairman and a leader in Congress. Why would you need my help? I mean, it's your community. You take care of it." He said, "Now, come on. Cut it out, will you? Don't talk like this." (NH laughs)

He said, "You know and I know that you're the only one that can pick up the phone, call Johnson, and say, 'Lyndon, This isn't going to work (NH laughs). These are fine people. These are people that are the backbone of our city.' Please, I'm here. Whatever you want to do, bang me around on the head, that's okay. But at the end of it, would you please pick up the phone and call the president (NH laughs)?" The review, and the Department of Transportation, remarkably had some creative engineering. So, when you go out, look out a window, going out to the Kennedy. You will see a "z." And in the pocket of the "z," there's a basilica.

RVR: They ride around it (RVR laughs).

NH: I guess that's power. That's governmental knowledge and political power.

RVR: You know, it's been said that he directed the Dan Ryan Expressway to keep the white population from African Americans. Do you think that's true, to keep them separated?

NH: Well, I don't have any first hand knowledge of that because I lived in Rogers Park. Therefore, I had to have a passport to go by Madison Street (RVR and DWV laugh). The fact that my father was from Bridgeport, there were things, you know (RVR laughs). But on a serious basis, that was all done before I was really on the scene. But I would doubt that very highly. I mean, if you look at it, the so-called ghetto, for lack of a better way of characterizing it, there was a ghetto. It was basically Bronzeville. It was basically in the south side. There was a square geography.

In the period after the war, I mean, if you take a look at the map now, take a look at where the African American community is. It's not just in that area of the south side. It's into the

Nineteenth Ward, into the city. It's certainly out on the whole west side. If you take the west side, the Thirty-sixth Ward, the Thirtieth ward, the Twenty-ninth Ward, the Twenty-eighth Ward, and the Twenty seventh Ward, all of those river wards, they weren't black at the time. I mean, that dynamic has changed. So the idea of building that kind of a highway, think of it in the context of five highways. How would you chop the community? It just doesn't make any sense. I don't know. I don't think so.

RVR: The family denies it. They say that it wasn't his style.

NH: When you take a look at the access and the respect that he gave to the black elected officials and that sort of thing, again, compare the roles that people held in high offices and that sort of thing. I think the African American community fared very well here, compared to other cities.

RVR: Are you tired?

NH: No. Are you?

RVR: I was thinking that maybe my colleagues were.

NH: I think I may have gotten the three of them bored or something (pointing to DWV, JMW, and Tim Lacy (TL)).

DWV: Not at all.

RVR: No. They might have questions, too.

NH: Oh sure, ask anything.

Dr. Tim Lacy (TL): Yes. I was thinking about your time as lieutenant governor and attorney general. And you talked a little bit about your perspective on UIC, maybe from the sixties. But did any of your work later have any implications for the campus, its funding, its growth, and its

personnel?

NH: Well, I think I probably did more as the chairman of the World Trade Center with the campus, from an international point of view, than perhaps I did then. Let me go back and think about this. As the lieutenant governor, I don't think that there were any particular issues. I wasn't very impressed with the university, to be very frank with you. That's because I didn't think that the outreach was any good. I thought that it was, I don't know if this is the right word, but a dream. It was a dream for him, that there would be this great, urban university that would be the laboratory. And I didn't see it being used that way.

I never got invited over here. Well, I think I may have gotten invited to one class. But I mean to have this university in the middle of everything, anything that was happening in urban life in America was happening within blocks of the place. And this should have been the place that was triggering the change. I mean, this should have been where the testing mechanism took place. I mean, the internships that the kids have from here should be phenomenal. And I don't think, when I was the lieutenant governor, that I was ever invited here.

RVR: I'm not surprised.

NH: I'm trying think of it as attorney general. First of all, with the Board of Trustees at the University of Illinois, it's not a job that means anything politically to people up here. I said earlier, in response to other things, about when my dad told me to go downstate. Well, what does that mean? What it means is that if you take a look at the governor, the governor has one hundred twenty five thousand employees. There are two hundred fifty seven boards, departments, and commissions of every area of subject matter. There's a sixty billion dollar budget.

Okay, take a look at the mayor. The mayor's budget is five or six billion, I suppose, with forty thousand employees. There's more jurisdiction now than before, because of home rule. But still, it's much more limited than the state has. So, the fixation here is still on the city. So with the people who were running for the University of Illinois, it was never to be elected as a trustee there. It was never a stepping stone to anything else. I mean, you weren't going up the chairs to a broader office.

Then again, for a downstate person, it was very important because it was all Champaign

oriented. And I can't think of anybody from downstate that wasn't an alumnus of the university. I mean, it was a real good idea to participate in that. So consequently, the idea of the budgets that could have been here, the research dollars that could have been here, the caliber of faculty that could have been here, and the access to free faculty that could have been here wasn't happening. Or, if it was happening, it was a well-kept secret, because we come in with the outreach idea.

Champaign is a great university. With Southern, Eastern, and Western, they are all very, very important elements in their respective areas. So how much is left for here? Who is the advocate for it? Who does it really make a hell of a lot of difference to? That's because you've got advocates for Chicago, Northwestern, Loyola, and DePaul. We've got fifty seven major universities, I think, in the state. And they've all got advocates. But what's the constituency here, that it's going to demand quality? It always struck me that that's USC and this is supposed to be UCLA.

RVR: That's why we came here.

NH: Yes. Of the things that I could think of to analogize it to, of course that's not accurate because they're both not in the same city. But if Champaign is the University of Illinois as USC, let's say, it's established. It's first rate. I mean, the whole technology for soybeans that revolutionized food in the world was Dean (Orville G.) Bentley in the School of Agriculture. And that's just one example of thousands. Up here, is this being developed as UCLA? Or is this being developed as a grown up version of what was over at Navy Pier? What was it? Who were the leaders of it? So I think that was part of it.

I think that what you've done with the institute, and the most recent levels of leadership, has been very important. I mean, the first leadership program for the institute really brought the focus of the country to the campus more so, I believe, than any other event that I can remember. That's because it was a major thing. There was Daley and the whole Daley family backing it up. There were top speakers and top elected officials from around the country coming into it. There were the symposiums, the panels, and this and that.

The thing I enjoyed every bit as much was the critique the next day that Richard set up. They talked to a group of us that were invited. "What did you like? What didn't you like? How can we strengthen it for the future?" And he said, "I want you to think about this as a place where

we can develop what Chicago should be in the future, like a relationship with Chicago and China, for instance." I mean, it was really like that. Okay, that should be going on all of the time. I mean, what are the linkages?

I'll also say one other thing. As much as I think it improved, it also stopped, as far as the World Trade Center was concerned. With the exception of Dr. (Allen) Learner, he's the only contact that I've had over here. But when we try and do things with UIC, they wouldn't have any money. Well, we're 501(c) and a 501(c)6. We're one of three hundred nine world trade centers in the world. We don't get any money. It's literally pennies. There's no money in the size over here. It's crazy.

We had a program that we put on for the Corporate Council for Africa, agribusiness in Illinois. It was Illinois agribusiness matched with Africa agribusinesses. The corporate council came to Chicago instead of doing it in Washington. That's because they felt that this should be the capital of agriculture in the Midwest. I couldn't get the university to do anything. That was Springfield, too. Think of the budgets that are available. We could do programs over here all of the time and highlight the place. And if you tied it in with the Communications Department that you have here, you could get the coverage. It doesn't happen.

Dr. David W. Veenstra (DWV): How much of that was the mayor's vision? We hear the stories that he wanted this as a place that would achieve education for the city's young people that couldn't afford to go to Urbana as a dream. But then you spent a lot of time talking about the network he built here, of young professional people. Did he expect this to be a pipeline of people into city government and into business?

I mean, did he ever talk about that? That's because he did. He surrounded himself, early on, with young professionals who had good ideas. And he seemed to appreciate that a lot. I was wondering if he saw the university as a possibility to open that up to bring more young people in there to bring them to city government, to bring them to corporate leadership, and to keep corporations in the city? Did he ever speak about that?

NH: No. I don't think so. You see, the fight took place a little bit before I came. It was still going on then, to a certain degree. And then, in later years, it did as well. And it wasn't just a concept I don't believe, in his mind, for people whose families couldn't afford it. It was, I believe, to be

comprehensive. But certainly, it was a basic element of it. It was to make sure that no kid was denied a high quality education because of the economic status of his family. That didn't rule out any or all other economic and ethnic levels and everything else.

My guess with him would be that he would have seen it as that. If the kid couldn't get to Loyola, DePaul, Champaign, or wherever it might be, it was going to be right here. But when the mayor would get involved in something, it might start out as an empty square. But that square would fill up pretty quickly. It would get pretty dynamic and it would be exciting. I would be very sure that he would have expected that the atmosphere here would have been catalytic for the modern city. And a byproduct of that, I would assume, would be that people would go into businesses. You would have a business degree here that would be the equivalent of Kellogg, Chicago, or what have you. But certainly in the social sciences, in the urban planning areas, like politics and government, I mean, this is a natural for it.

One other thing I tried to get done here that didn't go anywhere was that there are a million and a half senior citizens in the state of Illinois. There are a million and a quarter disabled citizens in the state of Illinois. There are thirteen major categories of disabilities. It's much harder to organize a disabled community than it is the senior community. That's because the senior community has more time. I mean time available for different kinds of activities.

Whereas the disabled community, often times from minute one of their lives, are dealt the short hand by fate. So they don't have the resources. It's harder for them to come together and all that sort of stuff. And there's no place that you could find the state of the art for disability for supportive activities, like products and all sorts of things. It seemed to me that we get CHIP.

I wrote chips for comprehensive health insurance. And it was the hardest fight I was ever involved in. It took five years. We put together a coalition of one hundred eighty seven different groups and finally got CHIP passed. That was the testimony for the ADA, with Ted Kennedy and Bob Dole in the Senate. That's because we were the only ones that had actual cases. We had five thousand cases that we had worked with out of the attorney general's office.

But there was no place in the country where you could find the state of the art for products and for information. I wanted to see an institute or a museum, a living one here. It would be where this would be the sort of center, a world center frankly, for a city that was the best place for a disabled person to have a chance at a full life, in the sense of utilization, with whatever skills that they possessed and you could go to see. I mean, where do you go to see what

kind of equipment there is? Where do you go to find out that in South Carolina they've developed a technique that really could change the life of a kid in Wisconsin? They don't know.

So I thought with all of the medical stuff, and the social policy stuff, what a perfect place to create that. And there was the Rubloff money that was in existence in the state. So I wanted to use that as the money, to sort of challenge something. And then, combine it with the university and put it over by the experimental part. I forget what street it was. I couldn't get anybody to support it. It never happened. Now, if you think of it, with the interactivity that you can get with telecommunications, it could literally be the center point for all of the whole world to come into programs on the subject, equipment, and all sorts of things.

Anyway, what is there that the university is doing? And I'm sure there are some wonderful things that the university is doing. But if you asked me doctor, to tell you three things that the University of Illinois at Chicago is doing right now that are things we should really be proud of, in Chicago, in Illinois, and in the country....

RVR: I can't think of one.

NH: Well, there's one. It's the institute. That's because the institute is affecting it. It's not just that the mayor was a remarkable person, or that he had a lot of insight, vision, and a combination of political and governmental strength. But you also had a remarkable family. And in that group of admirers and supports of both generations, working with people like yourselves, there's a serious commitment in the university to create the best of its kind in the country.

RVR: It's my feeling that this university never used the mayor to the extent that it could have in dealing with Urbana, that was trying to hold us back. That's because they knew, ultimately, we would become the premier institution for high learning in the State of Illinois.

NH: It's because you have access to it.

RVR: And so, look at the kind of leadership that we were given.

NH: But by the same token, you asked me if there were twelve years?

RVR: When we came here, to create UCLA, we thought in twenty years we would reduce every bit of it.

NH: It's interesting that we came up with the same analogy.

RVR: I just wondered if you agreed with my thinking.

NH: Yes. Absolutely. There's no doubt about it. Well, I certainly am an admirer of the concept, if only the respect and the affection for the mayor to support his dream.

RVR: He was treated badly every time he came.

NH: Yes. Sure. But I'm talking about my involvement.

RVR: And you were never invited (RVR laughs).

NH: No. Let's say that there was a program that the university had that they needed. The budget? I don't care what it is. Well, you could bring together the legislators from the metropolitan area. You could bring together the elected officials. I can't think of anything budgetary that we couldn't get accomplished for this place.

RVR: We had to fight to get social work here. The Jane Addams School is down at Urbana taking care of the rich farmers. We don't have a law school here. We don't have a music school. We have the greatest orchestra in the world. It's all down in Urbana. And if we tried to bring it here, we had to fight tooth and nail to get the social work school established, the graduate school. But there's no law school, and no music school.

NH: Do you want a reaction?

RVR: Yes.

NH: Okay. I always figured in politics that you have to take the cards the way that they come up. Were there people I hated everything I stood for in politics? Absolutely. There's no doubt about it. If there was ever an election stolen from Democrats by Democrats, the governorship was. And it was because I always reserved the word no in my vocabulary. But in the twelve years that I was doing this stuff, I got a pretty fair cross section of substantial things accomplished.

How was that? You take the cards as they come up. You know that Urbana has got relationships all over downstate. Therefore, that goes into the committees in the legislature. All of those want football tickets. And all of those guys want basketball tickets, whatever it is, if the kids want to get in. That's fine. Now, what you do is that the left hand doesn't have to let the right hand know what it's doing all of the time.

Let's say that you want a music school. You should have nothing to do with it, except you get a couple of friends. And you sit them down and say, "Look, here's five pages with a one page summary. If this isn't the case for why a city like Chicago, with the greatest music tradition in the United States, that this urban university for Chicago's next generation shouldn't have its own orchestra or its own music school, then I don't know what is." Then you don't have to have anything to do that's going to come as a big surprise to you, with a possible exception.

If we were going to be a committee of four to get a music school, I'd say, "Okay." I'd try and debrief you. I'd try and reverse the tables for what you guys are doing here (NH and RVR laugh). I'd say, "Tell me every alumnus that you can think of, or anybody in families or whatever, that has something special about music attached to it. So that's mobilizing one constituency. Then tell me everybody in the legislature, of both parties, that there is any strong relationship with between UIC that's on music or anything else. And then, tell me of the press in Chicago, who are the people in electronic print that are the most favorable to the university in general, and certainly about music? I mean a music critic, for instance."

Then, you've given me the arrows for the quiver. Let's say I'm one of these couple of guys here. Our job would be to sit down and say, "Okay, how do you mobilize this thing? How do you organize it?" All that you're doing is not disloyalty. You're just providing me with information that I've asked for informally that is necessary for me to put together a case for something that I and my friends think is very important to the city and to the university. Now, if we don't have that kind of help, it's really hard when you're doing everything else in your other

careers.

But after that, then it's a question of, okay, we're supposed to have some sense of the legislative process, who the sponsors ought to be, and how do you neutralize this? What do they want this year that you're going to block? You're going to hold that hostage so they can't block yours (RVR laughs). So then, you shape this thing and you have a committee.

I'll tell you a story. You know the civic center? We were in the office. The mayor was with the chairman of the civic center committee. There was this lawyer who we'll leave nameless who was a very talented guy and ran up extraordinary bills. Nobody could figure out what in God's name he did. And it wasn't something to do with the mayor politically or anything like that.

Anyway, we were sitting there and the subject of the civic center came up. He said, "Oh, I'm glad to report that we worked night and day and we were able to accomplish it." So the mayor said, "Now, what were your fees?" Everybody in the room gasped (RVR laughs). He didn't say anything. The mayor said, "Well, you did good work. Thanks and congratulations on behalf of the people." So now, the meeting was over. And I said, "Is he kidding?" I didn't ask too often (NH laughs) what was behind things. He said, "Well, what he might have forgotten is that the sponsor of that bill was Jack Cassidy from Peoria."

Jack Cassidy's father and Jack Cassidy were good friends with the mayor. What actually happened, the way the thing got passed was that Daley had Cassidy have Peoria put in a bill for a civic center and then throw on an amendment at midnight (RVR laughs). The distinguished lawyer, I'm sure, was in his third hour of sleep, at least (NH laughs). And that's how the thing passed. That's how the civic center took place. So it's a combination, again, of the knowledge of the governmental process and the political ability to get it done. Well, it's the same thing here. Now, can you get everything that the university needs? Not at the same time. That's not going to happen. But it builds on itself, not that it's easy success. Once you get one process going, then you can build on that thing.

Now, let's say that the problem is that there is weak leadership consistently sent up here. And if the leadership up here gets too aggressive on behalf of this institution, education politics and medical politics are much, much tougher than regular politics. Those three I'd never want to try (RVR laughs). But our politics, I mean, you'd get a helmet and a chest protector and you could survive. Your politics is pretty tough stuff. But again, you know that they're going to want

stuff. And you could have a blue ribbon committee, when someone is leaving, for the selection of the new chancellor here. You could have the papers editorialize for it, the t.v. editorialize for it.

And really, do you know what Daley did with O(rlando) W. Wilson in the police department? Well, the only scandal that we had was the Summerdale Police Scandal. So the mayor decided that there were police officers that were looting t.v. stores and stuff like that. But it was the first real scandal that had happened. So, what he always did was that he would always go for the best. If you've got a problem, jump on it with both feet and make sure that you kill it. Well, that's the way that Daley dealt with this scandal. Bang! Don't wait for five minutes. Just go after it.

Well in this instance, he figured that the way to do this thing was to get the best criminologists to be the head of the blue ribbon committee. And that happened to be O.W. Wilson who was the professor of criminology at Southern California. So O.W. Wilson got brought in here. He was a very distinguished fellow in criminology. There was this legitimate blue ribbon committee. They interviewed people. And there was a big civic focus on the whole thing. Well, [inaudible] was astute enough to be aware that at the end of the process, the single, most capable person for the position was himself. So he recommended himself to Daley (NH laughs). And of course, he did have the credentials. By that time, Professor O.W. Wilson had come here. That would be something to watch, with what he did with the police department.

Well, you know what results are going to be, if it's going to happen the same way as before, from Champaign to up here. So the next time you're going to have a change, when that change is coming up, then, independent of anybody over here, you can get it done the same way I just outlined to you. That's not with the groups, but with the same linkages. All that it takes is one really good editorial talking about, "If this is ever to be the great university that's been envisioned, we spent one hundred million dollars on the budget," or whatever we spend.

And really say, "Measured by the educational statistics that now ranks," etc. It's time that the best minds in business, education, and whatever have the opportunity to review candidates and make a recommendation to the governor of who should be the chancellor. And with the structure, we should have a blue ribbon committee to do a strategic plan of the administrative structure. It's twenty-five years. Now is the time to look at it, and that kind of thing.

So in other words, people that really love the place and know what it should be like it

sounds, okay, there are people you can get to help without leaving fingerprints (RVR laughs). You're not supposed to leave tracks. The reality is that in a very polite way, you'll get murdered if you get caught. And that's not just your career in the institution, but whatever is important to you. But really, you don't leave tracks. So it's always easier if you're trying to give somebody else credit than if you're trying to take the credit yourself.

You asked me a very simple question, and of course, I built the whole watch factory for you, instead of just telling you the time.

DWV: Oh no, I appreciate it very much.

NH: What else do we have?

TL: I think you've covered things that we thought about asking and we were kind of debating about, such as Rogers Park, your family, and the beginnings of your relationship with the mayor. I mean, I don't really see anything. I had a question list. Maybe the very last thing on here that we haven't covered is what helped you persevere during some of the tougher times in your relationship with Mayor Daley and the Daley family?

NH: What was that?

TL: What helped you persevere during the tougher times politically, such as in the nineteen seventies when there was certain competition for power in the party?

NH: In what sense?

TL: Well, it was with Dan Walker, and the sort of populist revolt within the Democratic party. I was just thinking about what helped you persevere in your relationship with the mayor.

NH: I understand where you're coming from now. Well, a practical application with that are both Walker and Thompson. Thompson and I were sort of going up at the same time. Thompson would use the U.S. Attorney's Office. He investigated for five years. He was a friend of mine.

And I ended up getting a refund from the IRS. So it didn't work out too well for him (DWV and TL laugh). I mean, there's the trauma that you go through on a human level, and looking at your kids, oh my God. It's terrible stuff. But I was a committeeman. How does being a ward committeeman fit with being the lieutenant governor of the state?

I mean, one is up there, and one is the basic piece of the thing. What Walker said was that we would run together and govern together. And we did, during the course of the general election. I went all over the state with him. He was a very good campaigner. He was an absolute lunatic and a fraud. But he was a very good campaigner (RVR laughs). So I learned stuff from him. But that was the motto, "Run together and govern together." I raised money for him, and the whole thing. At four o'clock in the morning on election night, it was clear that we had won. He gave me a big embrace and said, "I couldn't have done this without you. And I meant what I said. We're going to run together and govern together."

At nine thirty the same morning, we gathered in his suite before the ten o'clock press conference. It was the first press conference after the election. So we were sitting there, it was him, [inaudible], Norton Kay, and Dave, who was his numbers guy. He said, "Well, of course, you'll indicate that you'll be resigning as the ward committeeman." And I said, "Why?" And he said, "Well, we just can't have that, with the machinists. That's past history."

I said, "Wait a second, Dan. What do I tell the people in my neighborhood?" That's what the committeemen do. Yesterday, and when the thing was announced last night, I'm sure they felt pretty good for the first time in the history of the community. Somebody from our neighborhood got elected as the lieutenant governor of our state. And these are people that I've grown up with. I've worked with them. My dad worked with them. The Jewish community was dedicated to Shul when he was dying. Whoever heard of that, if we can't do anything for anyone?"

Between that and the Loyola story, that was the kind of relationship that was there. I said, "Now, what happened between last night and this morning, that I'm supposed to tell them that they aren't worthy? There's something wrong with them. So I have to turn my back on them." He said, "Well, we can't get around all of that. But that's the way it's going to be. That's because if you don't, you'll have no office, no job, and no car." I say, "Well, if that's what it is, that's what it is."

I figured out what it was about fairly quickly. And what it was about was that he wanted to appear to be fighting with Mayor Daley, but not actually fighting with the mayor. By forcing

me, who was viewed as close to the mayor, to resign as a committeeman and repudiate the party that the mayor was the head of, I would be the one taking the shot at the mayor. And he would be fighting Daley by forcing it. You know, nobody could be affiliated with him, even at the highest level, that kind of stuff. It was a scheme. Well candidly (NH laughs), I don't think that the mayor was too heartbroken. He wasn't saying anything about the mayor. He was saying it about me (NH laughs). The mayor was pretty good at different moves at different times, too.

That would have been one time. If I was uncomfortable, it would have been easier to take the distance. At the inauguration, I invited the mayor, Mrs. Daley, and their whole family. They were the first row. Here was the podium. Here's where I was sitting. And that's where they were sitting. So that was the picture. I wanted everybody in the state to see that, as far as I was concerned, this was the person that was entitled to the most respect. So that was another one.

Our neighborhood was very difficult to be the committeeman. What Walker and Thompson both tried to do, the political writers would say, "That's my Achilles' heel." I was very successful in government, etc. But I couldn't deliver the majorities that the other machines were delivering. Well, the Forty-ninth Ward was a United Nations to start with, with a couple of universities and everything else in it. You know, the Forty-ninth Ward, the Forty-third Ward, and the Fifth ward are probably the most difficult ones in the city.

So it's just a game. This is the standard that you're measured against. Well, that one doesn't work. Well, this will be exciting. So we'll make it this standard. So Thompson's guys and Walker's guys, the P.R. guys, they would set that straw man up to make it look like I was weak and a failure. So if I had would have unloaded the committeemen, it would have been understandable in some point in time just because of travelling all of the time. They do that. When you have a ticket to support, the reason the independents were successful was that they would take the weakest link in the ticket. They wouldn't have a whole ticket. They would take the weakest office.

Let's say that X happened to be in that campaign, the weakest candidate. Well, they made a huge run. This is the key. This is the test of reform. Well, I and the people working with me have to explain why all twenty six candidates are a good idea. Well, in a neighborhood like ours, you don't. You can't do it. So in any event, in that sense, well, there was the convention. I don't know everything about the convention. But I know a few things about the convention. I guess they've been covered a little bit. I told Billy some of it that he didn't know. And I think maybe he

mentioned it.

I was at a party at Bill Platt's house. Bill was a CBS correspondent. We had gone to Loyola Academy together. It was the Sunday before the convention. He was having an open house for the CBS people. They had come into town, up to his house, from Miami. Walter Cronkite was there. And he was furious. They were knocking the hell out of the mayor. And the whole thing was a lot of con. I mean, if you take the 68 problem up here in the Republican convention, people died in a Republican convention. I don't know if you remembered that statistic or not.

They put it on an island with bridges that they could put up. People died down there. Why they were so furious at Daley at the outset of the thing was because they felt that he was the one who demanded that the Democratic convention be in Chicago. In those days, the equipment wasn't as anywhere as portable as it is today. And so, there was millions of dollars involved to break the equipment down and to transport it up to Chicago.

They wanted to have both conventions in Miami, so it would be easier for them, easier for their correspondents, etc. So he was shooting his mouth off about how terrible Daley is forcing this on the public, etc. Daley didn't want the convention. What happened was that President Johnson called him. He said, "You're the only one that I can count on as far as having a convention that will be done in the proper manner." So if you go back in history of the whole thing, I think you'll see that the site selection committee delayed its hearing that day, the day that they were going to announce what town it was going to be in. And then, all of a sudden, they were in a sort of semi recess.

Colonel Jack Reilly, who was the mayor's emissary, arrived from Chicago. Colonel Reilly was then called back into session. And they recognized Jack Reilly to make a bid. Now, this was the end of the whole process. It was all over. Make a bid on behalf of Chicago for the convention, which was exactly what President Lyndon Johnson asked the mayor to do, that he didn't want to do. And remarkably, the votes were there. And bang, all of a sudden, Chicago had the convention.

Now, one thing about leadership was that Daley respected leadership. We were expected to. If he was the chairman, and we voted him to be the chairman, he had the right to expect loyalty from us, and us to respect his leadership. Well, he gave the same thing to the president. I mean, he spent a lot of time trying to talk Lyndon Johnson out of Vietnam, which he never got

credit for. He was against it. But he wouldn't argue publicly with Lyndon Johnson, because of the respect, the relationship, and what have you.

It was the same thing here. He didn't want the convention. So we got the convention. So they were furious about that. And this was before anything happened, before the whole thing started. I'm not going to tell you that there wasn't any massive stupidity involved in some areas. But that's one thing. That night, Sunday night, we had a caucus. Before the opening of any national convention, the Illinois delegation, well a number of delegations, but particularly the Illinois delegation always holds a caucus. And it's always been a closed caucus. In other words, nobody is invited in. Whereas, the candidates usually want to go to the different caucuses, have a chance to appear, and this and that.

In my experience up to that time, we'd never had anybody in those caucuses. When the mayor was the chairman, he would always treat the members of the delegation with the utmost courtesy. In other words, it wasn't, "Come on. Sit down. Let's go." It was, "Ladies and gentlemen of the delegation, I'd like to ask the indulgence of the body to offer a recommendation." It was like he didn't have any votes. He would do it that way. And in this instance, he said he wanted to introduce an old and very dear friend of his and of the Democratic party in Cook County, Chicago, and a dear friend of President Kennedy's, a person whom he'd known for years.

He said, "And so, on this one occasion, I would ask leave of the body, for permission, to invite my friend to be given the privilege of addressing our delegation to bring to our attention a person who he knows well that he thinks it would be important for us to know better." And out came (Senator Abraham) Ribicoff. This was the old friend, the dear friend, etc. He said, "So Dick and I had been to the well so many times. He's the greatest mayor," etc. Well, you would think he was putting him up for sainthood. I mean, it was glowing.

It was Sunday night. And then Ribicoff said, "The person I'd like you to get to know better is neighbor, in one sense geographically. But he really isn't known as well as he ought to be. We're colleagues in the Senate. Here's George McGovern." In came McGovern. McGovern had about as much chance as addressing the Illinois delegation that night as the man in the moon. I mean, it's always been closed (NH laughs). So he wasn't going to be the exception. But Daley did that for Ribicoff, which was an extraordinary political courtesy, favor, or whatever you want to call it.

So fast forward to Tuesday night. We were in the convention. If you remember, Cronkite

had been ripping the hell out of him. Then, Daley went head to head with Cronkite. I don't know if you've ever gone back and looked at that interview again. But Cronkite was next to mumbling by that time. And Daley wasn't very nasty. It was very smooth. But he just ate him alive, because he was talking facts. And Cronkite couldn't overcome it.

So then, there were all of these things about "Fortress Chicago." Do you know what Fortress Chicago was? I said to a couple of the guys, "We had Wisconsin and California, two very rabid, emotional groups on our hands. I had been part of the host committee that had welcomed the California delegation when they flew in to the military side of O'Hare. When they came off of the plane, they were absolutely ugly. We had done all sorts of things to welcome them. So if you're that mad in the way in (NH laughs), you know, you're not going to be a lot better. And they were screaming. So I was concerned because we had a lot of older people in the delegation. We were the first ones. They were on either side. And they had the podium up here. So if a demonstration started, there would be a lot of them around. So I said to Dan Shannon, Morgan Murphy (Jr.), and other guys that were sort of my age, "Why don't we stand in the back of this thing?" If you ever did a blow up of the picture, they weren't thugs (NH laughs). I mean, we all had advanced degrees. Shannon just happened to be an all American from Notre Dame. So nobody was going to run through the back of the delegation, run the risk of injuring people, and that kind of stuff. Maybe that wasn't the best idea in the world. But it just seemed at the time, it wasn't any official task that we were given. But it just seemed like a common sense thing to do, in terms of the older men and women, and what have you. Then, if you noticed, we were facing this way. We were not looking at the people that way, like the police might do. Okay, that was one thing. Then, Danny....

RVR: You mean Rostenkowski.

NH: Yes. Well, I'll come back to that, the thing with him and Carl Albert. But that's a different thing. That's what cost Danny the speakership, actually. No, I was the one who went a little bit off in the sequence (DWV laughs). So then, Ribicoff got up there. We were getting our brains beat out with everything under the sun. And we thought, "Thank God, finally. Something is going to say something good about us." (NH laughs) Here was his oldest, dearest friend. That's because this was the first time that any of us had seen him since Sunday night. And Ribicoff

hadn't been saying anything negative that they'd be aware of. So this would be like Kennedy or somebody getting up and saying some good things for you. Then he started out with this stuff, and then the Nazi stuff. Well, Daley's favorite word was faker.

RVR: I was going to ask you about that (DWV and TL laughs).

NH: It was faker. I mean, he'd say, "That guy is a faker." Now, the picture that they show is the mayor with the hand up and the tough scowl. I think he was on one side and Rich was on the other side. It was something like that. Take a look at the picture of the delegation. Nobody was watching him to see how he was acting. Everybody had the same reaction. I don't know if I was saying faker. I mean, we thought that we were getting the short end of the stick for a lot of different reasons.

So anyway, now the thing was over that night. So we were leaving. I got a hold of Dan Rostenkowski and we were walking out together. And I said, "Dan, let's get a drink." So we went across the street and sat down. I said, "Dan, what the hell is going on? Admittedly, there are a lot of things I don't know about this business. But I know what happened Sunday night. And I know that this jerk got up and killed us. He was worse than anybody and he's supposed to be our best friend. What the hell is going on?"

So, Danny told me what happened was that on Monday, as part of these conventions, there's a courtesy. You'll make an appointment and you'll go in as a courtesy to see the chairman of the local party. You know, the senior people just drop in and do that sort of thing. They make appointments. So now you have the mayor. The mayor was the mayor (NH laughs). And the mayor was the chairman of the party. There were a lot of reasons.

So in the headquarters in the daytime, he had this whole string of appointments. The place was loaded. So the mayor was back in the office. Mary Mullen was bringing people in. She was his secretary. There was Matt, Danaher, and Dan. So Ribicoff showed up. And he demanded to see Daley immediately. He was loud and obnoxious. He didn't have an appointment. He didn't have anything. This was in the outer part. So finally, I think Mary went in after the mayor's appointments and told him. And he said, "Okay, bring him in."

Now, I wasn't there. But Dan was there. And Dan and I were sitting by ourselves Tuesday night at midnight. This was a good friend just telling me what the hell was going on. And he

said, "Dick, this thing is in bad shape. You've got to help. You're the only one that can get it done for us. With Bobby gone, it has to be you." He said, "Well, what are you talking about?" And Dan said, "You've got to call Ted and get him to run."

And he said, "What do you mean that I've got to call Teddy and get him to run? Abe, they gave Jack up. They gave Bobby up. There are all sorts of kids in that family. The only male left is Ted. What happens if the same thing happens to him that happened to the others? I'm not going to be the one that imposes on that family and run the risk. Joe and Mrs. Kennedy have gone through enough. All of the rest of them have gone through enough. And you want to put that kind of pressure on Ted? I'm not doing it. You're close to the Kennedys. You were in his cabinet. You were the secretary of the H.E.W. You were the guy from Connecticut who was such a big supporter. You do it."

He said, "No. They won't pay attention to me. You're the only one they'll pay attention to." He said, "I'm telling you, I'm not going to do it." He said, "you're out to destroy me. I know you're out to destroy me. You hate me because I'm a Jew. You're out to destroy me." So Danny said, "Are you crazy? We've been friends for years. You're the only person that we brought into the delegation. And just because I won't put that family in that kind of a position, with all of the young children and everything else that's involved, you think we're taking something out on you?"

He said, "It's the only way that I can win. Kennedy has to be the head of the ticket or I'm going to lose for the Senate." He said, "Look Abe, if you've done your homework, if you've taken care of your job, and taken care of your constituents, you're going to be all right either way." He said, "You're trying to destroy me. I know." He said, "I don't know any of that." He stormed out of there. So the only people that knew anything about it were the three that were in the room.

So even at that though, I'm sure Daley didn't expect what he got. And all of the rest of us didn't expect anything, except praise. Now, if that didn't have a little something to do with the nature of things, vis-à-vis the mayor, Ribicoff made a career out of being the victim. And the other thing was that Johnson, if you look at the film, somebody would come up to him with a piece of paper or tell him that there was a call for him. Underneath the podium, there's what they call the green room. That's where you go to wait before you speak, after you get your makeup on and rehearse or whatever.

Well, there's a phone in there. And that phone was connected to the LBJ Ranch. Air Force One was on the runway, the LBJ Ranch. Do you remember that they were dragging the convention out? The reason for that was because he couldn't make up his mind. He was going to come in and accept the nomination of the Democratic party, change the whole dynamic, and take the nomination. So he was calling the mayor, to get the mayor to delay the thing, to make the decision as to whether he was going to do it or not. And that's where Danny was part of the problem. Joe Albert, the speaker from Oklahoma, had had a heart attack. He had been sick. He didn't have his strength. He wasn't back in full health.

(end of video tape two)

TL: I didn't mean for you to recount all of 1968, if you didn't want to. I mean, in my original question, I was just looking for how you persevered during some of those tough times. You correct me if I'm wrong. But it sounds like you always came back to, "I'm working with my constituents, and Daley has always been behind me in that endeavor." And he was the one who pulled you to where you're from, remembering where you were from.

NH: Yes. Well, that was true. It wasn't what he had done for me or my constituents. Sometime, if we talk again, I'll tell you about the five times that he dumped me (DWV and TL laugh). One of the reasons for that was that he got it the hard way. And he wanted to make sure that we understood that, just because we had his help, we had to be able take care of ourselves when he wasn't around. That's giving him the complete benefit of the doubt. I suppose there are other reasons, too. But I think that had a lot to do with it. With him, it was respect. I respected him enormously. Next to my own father and mother, he and Mrs. Daley—who I thought was a magnificent person—were like second parents to Marge and myself. Mrs. Daley was my wife's model. I mean, we had our lives threatened. I mean, we didn't talk about the Liquor Commission, the syndicate, and all of that stuff, which is another chapter. But they pinned Marge up against the wall when she was eight months pregnant. They threatened to kill me and kidnap our kids.

TL: I read just a vague newspaper account of that.

NH: Yes. The next day, they tried to kidnap John out of the park at the end of the street. There was a guy who was a colonel, Dick Thomas, in the paratrooper's reserve. He was out of Fort Sheridan and he was coming home. He saw John being pulled away from this lady. She was helping Marge, taking care of the baby in the park. Dick jumped the fence. He was a big tough guy. He ran him off. But they pinned her up against the wall when she was eight months pregnant with a car. There were three guys in the car. I think I had my lug nuts taken off maybe a dozen times for different things.

One time they came up to her at a party. A guy said, "Are you Neil Hartigan's wife?" She said, "Yes." She was greeting him very politely, nicely, and that kind of stuff. One guy wound up and smashed her. She lost part of her hearing over here. I was talking to Mrs. Daley the next morning. She called me at six thirty and she said, "They found that guy." I said, "No. Frankly Mrs. Daley, if they'd found that guy, he'd be doing something else right now." She said, "Well, when they do find him, I want you to make sure you let me know, because I want to see him myself." (NH, DWV, and TL laugh) I'm sure that if she had a chance, she would have. I mean, she was just a wonderful person in a thousand different ways. But there was a lot of that stuff. We're not captain courageous.

RVR: That's politics for you.

NH: Well, that's one part of it. Every time there were licenses, and we revoked two hundred licenses. When I say we, the mayor is the local Liquor Control Commissioner in each city in each state of a certain size. So Mayor Daley was the Liquor Commissioner. I was there for about two weeks. The headlines on the Chicago Sun Times said, "South State Street Running Wide Open." Well, the guy that was doing the job thought he was a constitutional scholar or something. I don't know what he thought he was. But he wasn't doing much on the job (NH laughs). So I got to the office. And I was just getting used to what was going on in the place.

TL: This was when you were administrative assistant?

NH: It was right at the beginning, about two weeks into it. I remember reading the article. And I said, "Thank God I don't have that part." (NH laughs) So I got in there. And the secretary said, "The mayor would like to see you." So I went in to see the mayor and he said, "Sit down." He

said, "How would you like to be the Liquor Commissioner?" I said, "Liquor Commissioner? (NH laughs) Well Mr. Mayor, I can't tell you that I haven't frequented a couple of the places (NH laughs). But I don't have any experience in administrating that kind of stuff (RVR laughs)." He said, "You'll do fine job." I said, "Well, what do you want me to do?" He said, "Do what you think is right."

That was the only standard he ever gave me for anything he ever gave me to do. "Do what you think is right." So we ended up revoking two hundred licenses. New York did twenty-nine. For Detroit, in the Kerner Commission Report, they would talk about the bust out joints. They had two. Well, if you only have two revocations, that means the fixes are in all over the place. And they know that there's no enforcement. So they just run wild all over the place. So we revoked two hundred. What that meant was that we were ten times more than anybody else. That meant that the licensee could no longer hold a license, nor could the spouse, nor could anybody who owns more than five per cent of the corporation, period. They were out of business. The premises couldn't be used for a full year.

If you shut down a joint on Rush Street, imagine the loss of revenue, etc. Then, in addition to that, that was the revocation, it started with three, and then went up to thirty days. Well, I did two thousand cases at my own desk. That was because I wanted those people to know, especially the mom and pop joints, that they didn't have to go and see anybody. You know, I couldn't guarantee what was going to happen at the police station, the court system, or anything else. But the one thing I could guarantee for the mayor was that they would know that they didn't have to see anybody. They had a chance to come in face to face, without a lawyer, and make their presentation. And so, you could make a judgment on the people you were dealing with. So I did two thousand of those cases. And then, we set up a panel with O.W. Wilson, John Melaniphy who was the corporation counsel, and myself, to review every one of the cases that came in. So we set up a model system. One of the things that I've always felt, and it was the most telling about the mayor, was that the worst people in the business, was that they'd come to see me and say, "Jesus, will you lay off of me. You're killing us." And I'd say, "Look, prostitution, narcotics, bad gun cases, you're going down. I mean, that's it. The mayor told me to clean it up and I'm cleaning it up." And they'd start screaming. I'd say, "Look, his office is right there. You've known him longer than I have. Go on in." Not one of them, in the whole time I did the Liquor Commission, would go in and talk to Daley about a prostitution case, a narcotics case, or

one of those kinds of things. That's because he would have thrown them through the window, and they knew it. I'm telling you the toughest guys, if you wanted to pick out five or ten names that you could think of that would qualify for that, we would probably come up with pretty much the same list. They were afraid of him. That's a whole different dimension, his moral compass, vis-à-vis the guys that nobody knew, the things that were going on. Like I said to you, I was making ten thousand dollars a year. A fix was a minimum of ten thousand. That's because, you'd lose your license. And it would be like, "I'm a lawyer. If I lose my license, I couldn't earn my livelihood?" Well, the saloonkeeper could never get any back either because they lost their livelihood and all of the rest of it. So it was really a very tough penalty.

RVR: Sir, we are very grateful to you. Thank you so much.

*****END OF INTERVIEW*****